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Art, Obscenity and the First Amendment
Judith Bresler*

The United States Supreme Court generally provides an accurate
reflection of the times. In the late 1980s a political strain of conservatism found voice in such issues as abortion and discriminatory labor
practices. This climate may be receptive to limitations on first amendment freedom of expression as witnessed by the recent Mapplethorpe
controversy discussed later in this article. Even so, the first amendment
does not constitute an unbridled license for freedom of expression.
Clearly, an artist may not damage private or public property in the
name of artistic expression. Injury to private property would constitute
a trespass, enabling the owner to enjoin the activity and recover damages from the artist; damage to public property is usually a crime
under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction. Moreover, the laws
against obscenity, defamation, invasion of privacy, and speech and conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace provide limits, albeit evolving
ones, within which constitutionally protected expression must fall.
Although the Supreme Court has endeavored to deal with the
problem, it has never provided a concise definition of obscenity. In
1957, obscenity was held by the Supreme Court to be outside of the
protection of the firsf amendment in Roth v. United States.' In affirming a conviction of a New York publisher and distributor of books,
photographs, and magazines for violating a federal obscenity statute by
mailing and advertising obscene materials, the Court attempted to set a
standard for defining obscenity-that is, "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."2 A final
consideration of the allegedly obscene material was whether it had
* © Judith Bresler, 1989. All rights reserved. Ms. Bresler is in private practice in
Scarsdale, New York, specializing in art law and is the co-author of the recently published book ART LAw: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS & ARTISTS
(1989).
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In its holding, the Court rejected the test of Regina v.
Hicklin, 3 L.R. - Q.B. 360 (1868), which required a judging of the material according
to the effect of an isolated excerpt on particularly susceptible persons.
2. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
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"even the slightest redeeming social importance."" If it did, the material was constitutionally protected. In a subsequent case,4 the Court in
1964 held that the standards in Roth were national rather than community standards.
In 1966, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts," the Attorney General of
Massachusetts sought to have the book Fanny Hill declared obscene.
The Supreme Court refused to do so, holding that the mere risk that a
work may be exploited by panderers because of its pervasive treatment
of sexual matters is not sufficient to make it obscene. Rather, to establish obscenity, the prosecution had to prove three separate elements:
first, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; second, the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and third, the material
is utterly without redeeming social value.6 However, in 1973 the
Memoirs test was modified substantially, and the national interpretation of standards was overruled.
In Miller v. California,' the appellant had been convicted under
California law for unsolicited mailing of obscene material. He had conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated
"adult" material. The Supreme Court noted that the context of review
was limited, involving the interest of a state to prohibit the dissemination of obscene material when its distribution carries the "significant
danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles." 8
However, nearly eight years after the Memoirs decision, the
Court, unhappy with the abstract nature of the guidelines established
for determining obscenity, decided to try again. Thus, the Miller court
held that whether a work is adjudged obscene depends on whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-

3. Id. at 484.
4. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964).
5. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
6. Id. at 418.
7. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
8. Id. at 19.
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entific value.9
From those new guidelines emerged two significant revisions in the
constitutional standards. First, the Court totally rejected the Memoirs
requirement that a work must be "utterly without redeeming social
value" in order to be obscene. 10 The Court also concluded that the
Memoirs test too readily permitted an opportunity for the exploitation
of obscene works:
Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any more
than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in
such public places. At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment
protection."1
Second, the Court promulgated the local community standard
guideline, so that a work not considered obscene in one state or county
or town may constitutionally be considered obscene in another. The
Court opined:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or
New York City. . . .People in different states vary in their tastes
and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.' 2
The community-standards guideline, however, did not provide the
states with free rein to set their own standards of obscenity, nor was
that the Court's intention. As the Court made clear, only materials depicting sexual conduct can be limited by obscenity regulation.' 3 Although the Court did not attempt to propose specific regulatory guidance for states faced with conforming their obscenity statutes to the
Miller guidelines, it did provide several examples that could be regulated by state law: "Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated [and]
9. Id. at 24.
10. Id. at 25-26 (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419).

11. Id.
12. Id. at 32-33.
13. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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patently offensive representation or description of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 14
The Court also made it clear that it considered only hard-core pornography obscene and, therefore, subject to regulation by the states.
The Court characterized its holding in Miller and its companion
cases,"5 known as the Miller "quintuplets,"' 6 as insuring that "no one
will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written
or construed."'"
The years after Miller have found the state courts wrestling with
the new standards for determining obscenity. Some of the great difficulties posed for the states have been in attempting to define what constitutes a community for the purposes of ascertaining its moral standards' 8 and in drafting a state statute to comply with the Supreme
Court's specificity requirement.' 9 In addition, courts have grappled
with the extent of the discretion permitted communities iii determining
what is obscene.
In Jenkins v. Georgia,20 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the manager of a theater in Albany, Georgia, for showing the
film Carnal Knowledge, which the trial jury deemed to be obscene. The
Supreme Court rejected the state of Georgia's argument that the trial
jury's determination of the issue is conclusive. The Court stated:
Even though questions of appeal to the 'prurient interest' or of 'patent offensiveness' are 'essentially questions of fact' it would be a
serious misreading of Miller to conclude that juries have unbridled

discretion in determining what is 'patently offensive.' Not only did
we there say that 'the First Amendment values applicable to the

14. Id. at 25.
15. Miller had four companion cases: Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, injunction afid, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939
(1974); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123
(1973).
16. L. DuBOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 258 n.1 (1977 & Supp. 1984).
17. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
18. See, e.g., Davison v. State, 288 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1973), stay denied, 415 U.S.
943 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Papp v. State, 281 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973) vacated, 298 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1974).
20. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary' (citation
omitted) but we made it plain that under the holding 'no one will
be subject to prosecution for sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard
21
core" sexual conduct ....
The Court also noted that where hard-core pornography is involved, the states can define obscenity in terms of local community
standards either specifically or by referring the issue to the understanding of the local jury. Since, in the Court's view, the motion picture
Carnal Knowledge did not involve the public depiction of hard-core
sexuality for its own sake and for commercial gain, made punishable by
Miller, the conviction could not stand.22
Many of the appellate decisions following Miller appear to focus
on the method of determining community standards. A number of jurisdictions appear to prefer statistical evidence. For example, it was
found that a Texas trial court had erroneously excluded a Harris
County theater operator's statistical evidence of community patronage
of Deep Throat (a film comparable to that shown by the defendant).
The evidence was offered as circumstantial evidence of contemporary
community standards.2 3 Nevertheless, the question of a work's obscenity rests on the local standards of the community in which the work is
located or displayed. Thus, a "fine-art multiple"2 4 produced in an edition of 200 and marketed nationwide may be subject to as many as 200
local community standards, as well as the federal standard under the
Comstock Act2 5 , which makes it a criminal act to mail or broadcast
obscene material.
The method of marketing a work of art may also be of special
significance in determining whether it is obscene . If pandering is present, the work will most likely be considered obscene. Pandering is defined as "the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly
advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers." 2 6 Thus, it

21.
22.
23.
Nelson,
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
Keller v. State, 606 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). See also, People v.
88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 410 N.E. 2d 476 (1980).
These are artworks such as lithographs, etchings, engravings, and silkscreens.
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988).
Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303 (1978).
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is conceivable that a jury may determine that a work of art has some
slight artistic value, but, nevertheless, find the dealer in whose gallery it
is exhibited guilty because the artwork was solely advertised and promoted as sexually provocative2 7
The Court has restricted the application of obscenity statutes when
the materials in question are privately possessed. In Stanley v. Georgia,28 the Court held that although public dissemination of obscene
materials may be regulated, states cannot make private possession of
those materials a crime.29 However, the Court did draw narrow boundaries around the zone of privacy afforded by Stanley. In United States
v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film,3 0 decided at the same time as
Miller, the Court held that the importation of obscene materials can be
regulated even if those materials are intended solely for private use.
This case involved the forfeiture of allegedly obscene motion pictures
that had been seized at the time of their entry into the United States.
By virtue of Court decisions, a gallery open to the public cannot with
impunity possess or display obscene works." It is conceivable that the
possession of such works in an artist's studio-from which works may
be sold-may also be constitutionally unprotected.
Since, in obscenity cases, the Supreme Court considers the rights
and the interests of the state and offended viewers, as well as the rights
of the speaker, performer or exhibitor works displayed to a captive or
unwilling audience are more likely to be deemed constitutionally unprotected than are those not so displayed. In Close v. Lederle,32 decided in
1970, a federal court of appeals held that where there is, in effect, a
captive audience, people have a right to protection against "assault
upon individual privacy" short of legal obscenity. The plaintiff in the
case-the well-known painter Chuck Close, then an art instructor at
the University of Massachusetts-exhibited his paintings on the walls
of a corridor in the student union. The exhibition, involving clinically
explicit nudes, proved to be controversial and was removed after five of
the twenty-four days scheduled for its display. The plaintiff, claiming
that his constitutional rights were invaded, sought to have the space
27. See, e.g., Splaun v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 598 (1977); Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 130 (1974); Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966).
28. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
29. Id. at 568. See also, United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
30. 12 200-ft. Reels, 413 U.S. at 123.
31. See, e.g., Slaton, 413 U.S. at 49; Orito, 413 U.S. at 139.
32. 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
33. Close, 424 F.2d at 990.
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made available for his exhibit for the equiyalent of the unexpired period. In dismissing the complaint, the federal appellate court drew an
analogy between visual speech and pure speech:
There are words that are not regarded as obscene, in the constitutional sense, that nevertheless need not be permitted in every context. Words that might properly be employed in a term paper
about Lady Chatterley's Lover, or in a novel submitted in a crea-

tive writing course, take on a very different coloration if they are
bellowed over a loudspeaker at a campus rally or appear prominently on a sign posted on a campus tree.34
"Freedom of speech," the Court continued, "must recognize, at
least within limits, freedom not to listen." 35 Because the paintings were
displayed in a passageway regularly used by the public, including children, the Court reasoned that the university officials could consider the
primary use of the corridor as a public thoroughfare, with the public, in
effect, a captive audience. Therefore, the officials had a right to afford
protection against assault on individual privacy.36
In a similar vein and citing the decision in Close, a Massachusetts
federal district court in 1988 upheld a regulation banning nude bathing
at a Cape Cod national park. 37 The court held the regulation did not
infringe upon the first amendment rights of women to bathe in the
nude to protest their exploitation by American society, and noted, "not
only is a public beach an unlikely and unnecessary showcase for nude
expression, but also nudity there significantly intrudes upon others who
did not seek it out and may be offended by it."' 38
In an exhibition of artwork depicting nudity or sexual conduct,
consideration should also be given to minors. Works that are not obscene may, nevertheless, be regulated by states to the extent appropri34. Id. (citing Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv.
1027, 1058 (1969)).
35. Id. at 991.
36. But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), which has since limited
the application of the captive-audience theory to those instances in which "substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." However, as
subsequently noted in Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F. Supp. 644, 651 (N.D. Il1.
1979), the "facts of Close are such that the action of the university might well be
justifiable even in light of Cohen."
37. Craft v. Hodel, 683 F. Supp. 289 (D. Mass. 1988).
38. Id. at 294.
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ate to protect minors.3" A New York statute, for example, prohibits the
sale to a minor of any artwork depicting nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse.4 °
The denouement of the recent Mapplethorpe controversy took its
cue from the Supreme Court's guidelines for obscenity as found in
Miller. In the Mapplethorpe matter, a storm of protest arose throughout much of Congress in reaction to exhibitions of works by two provocative photographers. These exhibitions were presented by two federally funded groups. The two arts organizations-the Institute for
Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania and the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art in Winston-Salem, North Carolina-subsidized, in part, by the National Endowment for the Arts,
sponsored respective photograph exhibitions of the work of Robert
Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano. The work of Mapplethorpe, which
included homoerotic scenes, and the work of Serrano, which included a
depiction of a plastic crucifix submerged in the artist's urine, were
found by some members of Congress to be sacrilegious or indecent. Indeed, Senator Jesse Helms proposed modifying an Interior Department
appropriations bill to include restrictions that would bar federal arts
funds from being used to "promote, disseminate or produce obscene or
indecent materials, including but not limited to depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts; or material which denigrates the objects or beliefs of
the adherents of a particular religion or nonreligion."4 1 The Helms
measure would have also barred grants for artwork that "denigrates,
debases or reviles a person, group or class of citizen on the basis of
race, creed, sex, handicap, age, or national origin."42 Although the
North Carolina Republican's amendment was originally adopted by the
Senate in July of 1989, it was later rejected by Congress in September,

1989. 43

The following month the Senate approved and sent a proposed bill
to the President to sign into law which, while less stringent than the
proposed Helms measure, nevertheless restricted, for the first time in
the United States, federal arts financing on the basis of content.44
39. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968).
40. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1989).
41. See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1989, § 1, at 1 (city ed.).
42.

Id.

43. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1989, § 1, at 27.
44.

Id.
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Under the new law, federal monies are barred for:
materials which in the judgment of the National Endowment for
the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be
considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or
individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.45
Additionally the new legislation requires that the chairman of the
National Endowment for the Arts and a council review all art financed
through the hundreds of subgrants made each year-and that a commission be established to review the Endowment's grant-making procedures and standards. In determining whether the standards require
change, the criteria to 46be considered include the Miller guidelines for
determining obscenity.
As noted, passage of the new legislation marks the first time Congress placed a limitation on arts grants on the basis of content. The
irony of such limitation becomes breathtaking when viewed against the
backdrop of change in the conception of censorship in certain other
nations. In the Soviet Union, shifts in what is permitted to be seen,
particularly on the stage and in film, are apparently striking enough to
warrant the phrase "full-frontal glasnost." 47 In France, where there is
little private patronage of the arts and where the Ministry of Culture
and Communication is accordingly the "cultural monarch," there is
virtually no censorship at all, and the French Parliament generally approves appropriations for the arts without scrutinizing the fine print.48
In West Germany, to cite still another example, the federal government, largely in reaction to the atrocious misuse of the arts under Nazi
rule, has little voice in how its appropriations are used. There, neither
politicians nor churches involve themselves in the arts. It is their belief
that the "labeling of a work as pornographic or casting a judgment of
it as non-art inevitably backfires." 9
This growing tendency of governments abroad to recognize and
even subsidize as art an increasingly diverse array of expression forces
45. Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (103 Stat.) 741.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, § 2, at 1.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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the compelling question: Will the new legislation in the United States,
with all its restrictions, quell some of creativity's greatest impulses and
harbinger the stillbirth, rather than the realization, of what might have
been some of American's finest art?
Author's Note:
At the time this article went to print, the new restrictive arts legislation
had already been tested. While it did not, in this case, prevail, it caused
a skirmish between the communities of art and politics and made headlines for weeks throwing into sharp focus the issue of whether the
United States Government would continue to provide financial support
to art without legislative intervention. In this particular situation, the
National Endowment for the Arts, as a result of the new law, withdrew
its sponsorship on November 8, 1989, of a New York City art show
about AIDS entitled, Witnesses: Against Our Vanishing. John E.
Frohnmayer, the new chairman of the NEA, in suspending a $10,000
grant to Artists Space, the nonprofit gallery in the TriBeCa section of
Manhattan which commenced its exhibition of the show Thursday, November 16, 1989, originally gave as his reason for the Endowment's
withdrawal of support the fact that the exhibition was making a politi50
cal statement in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.
The exhibition includes images of homosexual acts, and the show's catalogue contains derogatory comments about such public figures as John
Cardinal O'Connor, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York
Representative William E. Dannemeyer, Republican of California, and
Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina.
When, in the ensuing days, Mr. Frohnmayer's decision evoked a
storm of criticism from public figures in the arts as well as lawyers,
artists, arts advocates, and educators, 51 he subsequently asserted that
his decision to withdraw support was, rather than on any political rationale, based on "an erosion of the artistic focus" in the show. 52 Under
continuing heavy protest, including a decision by Leonard Bernstein,
the composer and conductor, to refuse the National Medal of Arts
award, 53 the NEA chairman on November 16 reversed himself and
agreed to restore the $10,000 grant to the gallery for the exhibi50.
51.
52.
53.

See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, § 1, at 1 (city ed.).
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, § 3, at 20 (city ed.).
Id.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1989, § 3, at 26 (city ed.).
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tion-provided that the monies not be used to pay for the show's
catalogue. 4

54. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1989, § 1, at 1 (city ed.).
This article only touches on some of the first amendment issues the artist, dealer,
and collector must confront. For a detailed analysis of these and other first amendment
issues, see Lerner & Bresler, ART LAW-THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS,
DEALERS AND ARTISTS

ch. 7 (1989).

